




























In the year 2000, the German government passed the most ambitious tax reform in
post-war German history aiming at a signiﬁcant tax relief for households. One central
aim of this tax reform was to improve work incentives and, thereby, foster employment.
In this paper, I estimate an intertemporal discrete choice model of female labor supply
that allows to analyze the behavioral eﬀects of the tax reform on the labor supply of
married and cohabiting women over time. Using the Markov chain property, I analyze
the dynamics of labor supply behavior and derive the short- and long-run labor supply
eﬀects of the tax reform.
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In the year 2000, the German government passed the most ambitious tax reform in post-
war German history aiming at a signiﬁcant tax relief for households of about 32 billion
Euro per year. An important aim of this tax reform was to improve work incentives
and, thereby, foster employment in the sluggish German economy. The following analysis
focuses on the part of the reform related to the personal income tax which has been
implemented in several steps starting in the year 2001.1 By 2005, the top marginal tax
rate was reduced to 42%, compared to 51% in 2000. In the same period, the lowest
marginal tax rate was reduced from 22.9% to 15%, and the basic tax allowance increased
from 6,902 Euro to 7,664 Euro.
Several studies have analyzed the distributional, ﬁscal and behavioral eﬀects of the
German Tax Reform 2000. Corneo (2005b) shows that this tax reform had a regressive
impact on the income distribution, since in particular high income households beneﬁt
from the reduction of the marginal tax rates. Previous ﬁndings of Wagenhals (2000b)
and Haan and Steiner (2005 and 2006) are in line with this result. Moreover the latter
studies focus on the work incentives and labor supply eﬀects induced by the tax reform
and ﬁnd that the reduction of the tax burden was leading to a signiﬁcant, yet relative to
the ﬁscal cost, to a modest increase in labor supply.2 The mentioned studies employ a
behavioral microsimulation model combined with a static discrete choice labor supply esti-
mation. Based on the labor supply model, behavioral responses along the extensive margin
(employment participation) and the intensive margin (working hours) can be analyzed in
the household context. This methodology has become standard for ex-ante evaluations
1Amongst others, Homburg (2000) and Soerensen (2002) discuss and analyze the eﬀects of the tax
reform for corporations and entrepreneurs.
2All mentioned studies on the tax reform 2000, analyze the reform from an ex-ante perspective by
simulating the mechanical and behavioral eﬀect of the tax reform. So far, an ex-post evaluation has not
been conducted as the required data for the ﬁscal year 2005 are not yet available.
1of tax and transfer reforms as labor supply incentives can be accurately described and
non-linearities in the budget set can be incorporated in a straightforward way (Blundell
and MaCurdy, 1999). There exists numerous applications of this methodology for several
countries, e.g. Aaberge, Dagsvik, and Stroem (1997) for Norway, Blundell, Duncan, Mc-
Crae, and Meghir (2000) for the UK, or Flood, Hansen, and Wahlberg (2004) for Sweden.
In these studies a variety of important advances of the standard discrete choice labor
supply approach have been suggested, i.e. the treatment of unobserved heterogeneity, the
modelling of welfare participation (Flood, Hansen, and Wahlberg, 2004) or allowing for
diﬀerent job-wage-task packages (Aaberge, Dagsvik, and Stroem, 1997).
However, the shortcoming, common to all previous studies, is that the labor supply
behavior is estimated in a static framework. The static modelling implies that households
can immediately adjust their behavior given a change in the work incentives. This as-
sumption, however, has been rejected by numerous studies that ﬁnd strong evidence for
true state dependence in the labor supply behavior, an early example is Heckman (1981a).
True state dependence measures the eﬀect the previous working behavior on the current
labor supply decision.
The aim of this paper is to overcome this shortcoming of the aforementioned studies
and to apply an enhanced framework for the ex-ante evaluation of policy reforms in the
tax and transfer system. Instead of using the static approach, I employ an intertemporal
discrete choice labor supply model that allows to estimate behavioral responses along the
intensive and extensive margin in the household context, as proposed by Haan (2006b).
In this framework true state dependence in labor supply is explicitly modelled. I employ
a dynamic conditional logit panel data model with random eﬀects where the choice of
discrete labor supply alternatives is estimated conditional on the labor supply of the
last period, on individual, household and alternative speciﬁc variables and on unobserved
2heterogeneity. Unobserved heterogeneity is modeled nonparametrically as suggested by
Heckman and Singer (1984). It is necessary to control for unobserved heterogeneity in
order to disentangle true and spurious state dependence. The problem of initial conditions
is explicitly taken into account following Wooldridge (2005).
I employ this framework to analyze the impact of the German Tax Reform 2000 on
the labor supply behavior of married and cohabiting women. The analysis is based on
the German Socio Economic Panel Study (SOEP), a representative longitudinal study
containing socio-economic information of about 12,000 households. I estimate the short-
run labor supply eﬀects of the tax reform, and based on a ﬁrst order Markov process I
derive the eﬀects in the long run, i.e. when households have fully adjusted their labor
supply behavior. My results show that in the sort run, after the ﬁrst year, the labor
supply responses of women are modest as state dependence prevents the women to respond
immediately to the incentives induces by the tax and beneﬁt regime. In the long run,
however, state dependence looses its signiﬁcance and the women have fully adjusted and
thus the labor supply eﬀects markedly increase.
2 The German Tax Reform 2000
In theory, the German income tax is based on the principle of comprehensive income
taxation. That is, the sum of a household’s income from all sources is taxed at a single
rate after several deductions have been applied. In practice, there are various exceptions
to this rule, however, especially regarding the taxation of capital income and pensions.
Since the beginning of the 1990s households pay in addition to the standard income taxes
the “Solidaritaetszuschlag” a time limited tax supplement which has been implemented
in the course of the German reuniﬁcation. During the period of interest, 2000 - 2005,
the supplement amounts to 5.5% of the basis income tax. Another distinguishing feature
3of the German tax system is the principle of joint taxation of households, whereby the
income tax of a married couple is calculated by applying the tax function to half of the
sum of the spouses’ incomes; this amount is then doubled to determine the tax amount of
the couple.
Corneo (2005a) provides an historical overview of income taxation in Germany and
shows that following 1986 progressivity of income taxation was declining. During the 1990s
the German government implemented several minor reforms slightly reducing marginal
tax rates and increasing the basis tax allowance (Bach, Corneo, and Steiner, 2006). These
reforms however are not comparable to the eﬀect of the Tax Reform 2000.3
On July 6th 2000, the German government passed the law to implement the German
personal income tax reform 2000. The tax reform followed the example of several major
income tax reforms in other countries over the last decades. Prominent examples are
the tax reforms in the United Kingdom (Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir, 1998), the Tax
Reform Act 1986 (TRA86) in the United States (Auerbach and Slemrod, 1997) or the
tax reform in Sweden (Agell, Englund, and Soedersten, 1996). The central purpose of
the German Tax Reform was to stimulate private consumption and investment to foster
economic growth and thus to increase employment (Bundesﬁnanzministerium 2003). In
addition, it was the goal to reduce the distortional eﬀects of high marginal tax rates on
labor supply. According to calculations of the Federal Ministry of Finance the personal
income tax reform results in a total tax relief of households by approximately 32 billion
Euro.4
Figure 1 presents the marginal and average tax rates of the pre- and post-reform
schedule. Over the whole distribution of taxable income, marginal tax rates are lower in
3Wagenhals (2000a) estimates labor supply eﬀects of the moderate tax reforms in Germany during the
80s and 90s and ﬁnd small behavioral changes.
4The tax reform 2000 was implemented in three steps, yet in this study, I focus solely on the total eﬀect
of the reform. The ﬁrst step of the reform was implemented in the beginning of 2001, the second in 2004
and in 2005 the full reform was introduced.
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Tax schedule is for a single tax ﬁler and the tax supplement is not included.
the post-reform schedule 2005 than under the ﬁscal regime 2000. Up to taxable income
of about 50,000 Euro, the changes in marginal tax rates are relatively similar. However,
when taxable income reaches the top marginal tax rate, the gains from the tax reform are
increasing. This is due to the large drop of the top marginal tax rate from 51% to 42%. On
the lower end, the increase in the tax allowance excludes households with taxable income
lower 7664 form taxation. Before the reform, in the ﬁscal system of 2000, this threshold
was at 6902 Euros.
The German tax system is deﬁned in nominal rather than in real terms. That implies a
nominal increase of the taxable income leads to higher marginal tax rates, although in real
terms, the income of the household remains unchanged. This phenomenon is known as
bracket creeping in the public ﬁnance literature. To reimburse households for the loss due
to the bracket creeping, the government has to adjust the tax function over the years, either
by reducing the marginal tax rates or increasing the amount of the basic tax allowance. As
the cumulative inﬂation rate between 2000 and 2005 amounted to approximately 8.6%, this
5eﬀect is certainly not negligible. When analyzing the impact of the tax reform, I control
for bracket creeping following Haan and Steiner (2005) to calculate the real gains from
the tax reform. Thus, I subtract the tax relief necessary to reimburse the households for
the additional tax payments due to bracket creeping from the nominal gains attributable
to the tax reform.5
3 Methodology
The research strategy applied in the empirical analysis combines microsimulation with a
structural model of intertemporal labor supply behavior. Using microsimulation the work
incentives of a given tax and beneﬁt regime can be simulated. This mechanical eﬀect of
a tax reform captures the changes of the disposable net income without any behavioral
adjustment of households. Given these mechanical eﬀects which describe the changes in
the work incentives, the behavioral eﬀect of the tax reform can be evaluated using the
parameters estimated from a structural intertemporal labor supply estimation.
Microsimulation
I apply the tax-beneﬁt microsimulation model STSM that includes all relevant components
of the German tax and transfer system (Steiner, Haan, and Wrohlich, 2005). Gross income
of a household is calculated by adding all income components of the household members
observed in the data. Taxable income is then derived by deducting observed or lump sum
income-related expenses from gross household income. The income tax is computed by
applying the income tax function to taxable income of each person in the household or
of the spouses’ joint income, depending on marital status. Income tax, the tax supple-
ment and employee’s social security contribution rates are deducted from gross income,
and social transfers are added to derive the net household income. Social transfers in-
5Technically, I calculate the eﬀect of bracket creeping by simulating the tax payments of households
with inﬂated prices for the year 2005 implicitly assuming no increase in real wages, i.e. productivity.
6clude child beneﬁts, child-rearing beneﬁts, education beneﬁts for students, unemployment
compensation, housing beneﬁts and social assistance.
The base year for the analysis is the ﬁscal year 2000, since this was the last year before
the tax reform has been implemented. As the empirical analysis is based on panel data
spanning from 1999 to 2003, it is necessary to simulate tax payments and net household
incomes on the basis of the tax legislation in 2000 for years with a diﬀerent tax legislation.
This simulated hypothetical information serves as the basis for the analysis. In addition,
I simulate hypothetical post-reform tax payments for all households which diﬀer solely
due to the changes in the tax function and mimic the tax system of the year 2005. The
diﬀerence between the net household income derived on basis of the pre- and post-reform
legislation measures the gross mechanical eﬀect of the tax reform 2000 which has to be
adjusted for bracket creeping as described above in order to derive the (net) mechanical
eﬀect of the reform.
Econometric Speciﬁcation
In the following, I will present the econometric model and the estimation procedure which
has been proposed by Haan (2006b). Although the focus of this study is on the behavioral
eﬀect of married and cohabiting women, I model the labor supply of both spouses in a
joint utility model. Thus, the labor supply of the husband or partner is not exogenously
given but explicitly modeled within the framework. In the context of couple households,
discrete choice models of labor supply are based on the assumption that a household i is
faced with a ﬁnite number J of discrete bundles of working hours combinations of the two
spouses and the resulting net household income which provide diﬀerent levels of utility Vj
at period t. In this model, I assume that households do not save, thus consumption equals
the net disposable income.
In a static discrete labor supply approach the utility of a household is only conditioned
7on information of the present period t. To model the dynamics of labor supply, I introduce
state dependence of labor supply by conditioning the utility in period t on the lagged labor
market status of both spouses in period t − 1. The intertemporal framework applied here
does not describe the labor supply behavior over the whole life cycle. The agents are
assumed to be myopic in the sense that they do only incorporate their past employment
history yet not the future working behavior when maximizing their utility in the current
period. In this respect, the model is similar to the intertemporal framework of labor
market participation with structural state dependence developed by Heckman (1981b).
The level of of utility Vijt at the diﬀerent alternatives can be described as follows:
Vijt = U(lfijt,lmijt,yijt,zit−1,xit,ci,ijt). (1)
The utility function of a household U contains an observable and an unobservable
component. The observable component includes the leisure time of both spouses, lfijt
and lmijt, and the net household income yijt. Further, individual, household and time
speciﬁc characteristics of both spouses that are constant over the diﬀerent labor supply
alternatives, such as age or nationality xit enter the utility function. These variables can
be interpreted as taste shifters of preferences. In addition, the utility is dependent on the
realized working behavior of the previous period zit−1. This variable is constant over the
alternatives and aﬀects the preferences for leisure and income in the current period. The
unobservable component consists of a household speciﬁc term ci = (cim,cif) that is allowed
to vary for the spouses, and of a random error term that varies over time, households and
alternatives ijt. In this framework, the decision rule of a household has the following form:
both spouses maximize jointly household utility given the combination of both partners‘
leisure time and the household income and they choose the bundle j that provides the
highest utility for the household in period t. According to the empirical distribution
8of female and male working hours, 13 discrete bundles (J = 13) of household income
and female and male working hours are deﬁned out of which the household chooses one
bundle. In the data, only the income and working times of the chosen bundle can be
observed. Given the hours distribution, I derive the net household income for the non
chosen hypothetical hours points using the microsimulation model.6
The maximization problem of the household is subject to a budget constraint as net
household income depends on the working hours of the spouses, i.e the non-leisure time.
The discrete choice model is driven by the probabilities to choose each alternative J.
Given these probabilities, the optimal supply of weekly working hours can be determined
as the sum of discrete working hours weighted by their probabilities. Due to changes in a
household‘s budget function or due to changes of observed or unobserved characteristics
that deﬁne the utility it might become optimal for the household to adjust labor supply
over time. In a static model it is assumed that a household can adjust labor supply
immediately. This assumption, however, is only justiﬁed if state dependence does not
exist.
State dependence in labor supply is present if, given the observed and unobserved
characteristics, the working behavior of the last period aﬀects the current labor supply
decision. This could arise if the employment history is relevant for prices, preferences
and constraints of future periods (Prowse, 2005). Haan (2006b) summarizes potential
sources of state dependence, namely intertemporally nonseparable preferences, human
capital accumulation, or signaling and scarring eﬀects. Further, ﬁxed costs of work such
as search or transaction costs are potential sources of state dependence, as these might
diﬀer by the previous employment state Hyslop (1999) or Prowse (2005). In the empirical
analysis I will explicitly take account of child care costs which is the major ﬁnancial
6For non working individuals hourly wages are estimated on basis of a Heckman selection model. For
the speciﬁcation and the results of the wage estimation, see Steiner, Haan, and Wrohlich (2005).
9burden for women with young children and other ﬁxed costs of work. Thus, child care
costs are not part of potential state dependence. Further, I will distinguish between true
choice persistence and unobserved heterogeneity. Hence in this framework, it is possible
to analyze the eﬀect of true state dependence.7
Note, in this study I do not diﬀerentiate between voluntary and involuntary unemploy-
ment, thus all women choose their hours points voluntarily without facing labor demand
side restrictions. This addresses a general shortcoming of the labor supply literature.
Following Blundell, Ham, and Meghir (1987), there have been several attempts to intro-
duce involuntary unemployment into a structural labor supply model. Bargain, Caliendo,
Haan, and Orsini (2006) derive labor supply elasticities with and without labor market
constraints using the same data as employed in this study, and they ﬁnd that elasticities
accounting for involuntary unemployment are signiﬁcantly lower for single households and
men living in couples, yet not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for women in couples. This is because
the majority of the inactive married women chooses voluntarily not to work. Thus, the
assumption of a pure choice model for this group seems not to be restrictive even in a
country with high unemployment rates such as Germany.
When estimating the above deﬁned intertemporal utility function the problem of ini-
tial conditions needs to be accounted for, since the initial working choice might be not
at random. As a solution, I follow Wooldridge (2005) and assume that the conditional
expectation of the unobserved household eﬀect h(ci|zi0,xi;δ) is correctly speciﬁed, condi-
tional on the initial state zi0 and on household and individual speciﬁc variables that are
constant over time xi. Vector xi includes the mean values of all individual and household
speciﬁc variables, age, number and age of children, health status, region and nationality.
7Next to true state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity, there might be a third source of choice
persistence in the data coming from autocorrelation in the error terms ijt. Amongst others, Hyslop (1999)
accounts for serial correlation. Yet, Croda and Kyriazidou (2005) and Michaud and Tatsiramos (2005)
reject the hypothesis of a ﬁrst order autoregressive process in a dynamic labor supply model using micro
data for Germany. Therefore, I assume ij1, ..., ijT to be uncorrelated over time.
10The unobserved household speciﬁc error term ai captures the remaining unobserved het-
erogeneity that is by deﬁnition uncorrelated with zi0 and xi. In the estimation I allow ai
to be diﬀerent for both spouses, ai = (aim,aif) and model potential correlation. Insert-
ing the model of the unobserved household speciﬁc eﬀect ci into the above deﬁned utility
function, the utility of alternative j becomes:
Vijt = U(lfijt,lmijt,yijt,zit−1,xit,ci(zi0,xi,ai),ijt). (2)
Drawing on McFadden (1974), I assume the error terms ijt to follow a Gumble dis-
tribution. Then, a dynamic conditional logit model can be derived where the probability
of choosing alternative j from all J alternatives conditional on the explanatory variables
in period t, the chosen alternative of the previous period and the unobserved individual
eﬀect has the following form:





The household speciﬁc error term ai = (aim,aif) is speciﬁed nonparametrically fol-
lowing Heckman and Singer (1984). I assume that the household speciﬁc error term is
described by a bivariate discrete distribution with two points of support (mass points)
for the husband (am1,am2) and the wife (af1,af2).8 Hence, the household speciﬁc ef-
fect is described by four combinations of the male and female heterogeneity points, G:
(am1,af1), (am1,af2), (am2,af1) and (am2,af2), which are assumed to be constant for all
households which are chosen with some probability. This speciﬁcation is ﬂexible, because
it captures the correlation of the spouses‘ characteristics which are not observed. Note, for
identiﬁcation, only one mass point for each spouse is freely estimated; the other point is
8 Belzil (2001) employs a similar speciﬁcation estimating a discrete duration model.









πk = 1, (4)
where qk are the transformed probability coeﬃcients to be estimated. For identiﬁcation
q1 is normalized to zero. Mass points and the transformed probabilities are jointly esti-
mated with the parameters by maximum likelihood.9 Standard errors for the probabilities











Pr(Yit = j)ditj, (5)
where ditj = 1 if j is the chosen alternative and 0 otherwise. In the conditional logit
framework variables which do not vary over alternatives, are not identiﬁed. Therefore,
variables that are constant over alternatives (xit,xi) including the lagged dependent vari-
able zit−1 and the initial state zi0 enter the speciﬁcation as taste shifters of the preferences
for income and leisure. State dependence is modeled in linear and quadratic terms of both
spouses’ leisure time in the previous period. The initial state enters in a similar way. The
household speciﬁc unobserved eﬀect is included in a ﬂexible way as random coeﬃcient of
the leisure terms of both partners allowing for correlation of unobservable characteristics,
see the Appendix for a detailed speciﬁcation of the model.
4 Data
In order to empirically analyze the above derived intertemporal model of labor supply it
is necessary to employ panel data information of households. This study is based on the
9The model is estimated using the -ml- command in Stata version 8.2.
12SOEP which is a representative sample of over 12,000 households living in Germany with
detailed information about socio-economic variables on a yearly basis.10 For this analysis,
I draw on a balanced panel for the years 1999 - 2003. I concentrate on couples both
married and cohabiting where both spouses are aged between 20 and 55 years. Excluded
are households where at least one spouse is in full-time education, self employed or retired,
because labor supply of these groups diﬀer from the rest of the population. After dropping
households with missing information 1,645 households remain which are observed over four
periods. The ﬁrst period is required to construct the initial state of labor supply. Thus,
information of three periods enters the estimation proving variation over time and between
the alternatives.
[Table 1: about here]
The ﬁrst three columns in Table 1 yield information about the working alternatives
and the percentage of households choosing these categories. In Germany, part-time work
for men is very unusual. Therefore, the choice set for the male spouse is simply no work,
full-time and over-time. Women can choose between inactivity, two part-time categories,
full-time and over-time. Dropping two unusual combinations, where the woman is working
part time and the man is not working, 13 discrete choices of working hours have been
deﬁned. As expected, in this sample, the male labor market participation is far higher
than the participation of women. Whereas nearly 95% of all men supply positive working
hours, only about 75% of the women participate on the labor market.11 Part-time work
is very common for married women. More than 40% of the female population works part-
time. Interestingly, that holds not true for the eastern part of Germany which can be seen
in the last column. This, and the higher female participation rate in east Germany point
10For a detailed description of the data set, see Haisken De-New and Frick (2005).
11These participation rates exceed the participation rates of the whole working population as I focus on
an age group with relatively high participation rates.
13at the still very diﬀerent labor market behavior in east and west Germany.
In column 4, the expected disposable net household income in each alternative is
tabulated. The expected net household income for each household is derived on basis of
the microsimulation model. Actual child care costs are very high in Germany. This is due
to the limited number of subsidized child care facilities (Wrohlich, 2006). For this analysis
the actual child care costs for households with children younger then 6 years have been
imputed.12 The child care costs are subtracted from the simulated net household income
for the relevant households.
Table 2 provides information about all individual and household speciﬁc variables em-
ployed in the estimations.
[Table 2: about here]
5 Empirical Results
Estimation Results
Table 3 contains the estimation results for the dynamic conditional logit panel data model
with and without random eﬀects. In addition to the above presented ﬂexible model with
unobserved heterogeneity, I present results of an estimation where random eﬀects enter in
a more restrictive way. In the more restrictive speciﬁcation, I assume that the household
speciﬁc eﬀect is described only by two combinations of the male and female heterogeneity
points, G: (am1,af1) and (am2,af2).
[Table 3 : about here]
12Child care costs are estimated based on individual and regional information. They diﬀer by age of the
child. I thank Katharina for providing the data.
14The diﬀerence in the Akaike Information Criterion13 between the diﬀerent speciﬁca-
tions, and the signiﬁcance of the mass points and the probabilities, indicate that it is
necessary to include random eﬀects in a ﬂexible way to control for unobserved individual
eﬀects. Therefore, for the following interpretation, I focus only on the model where un-
observed heterogeneity is captured in a ﬂexible way. However, despite of the signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between the speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcients resulting from the diﬀerent estima-
tions are relatively similar. This ﬁnding is in line with Michaud and Vermeulen (2004) who
argue that the initial state captures most of the individual unobserved heterogeneity. As
mentioned above, state dependence can be disentangled in unobserved heterogeneity and
true state dependence. This can be found when comparing the three speciﬁcation: the bet-
ter unobserved eﬀects are captured the less important becomes the true state dependence,
namely the coeﬃcient of the lagged female leisure time.14.
In order to analyze and quantify state dependence in female labor supply, I derive a
transition matrix of labor supply choices M as described in Haan (2006b). The matrix is
derived conditioning on the estimated coeﬃcients of the lagged dependent variable holding
all other observable characteristics and the unobserved heterogeneity constant.15
[Table 4 : about here]
The estimated state dependence is simply the diﬀerence in the probability within
an column. The estimated transition matrix clearly supports the hypothesis of state
dependence on the extensive margin as choice probabilities given the lagged status diﬀer
signiﬁcantly. The probability of inactivity in the current period conditional on not working
13The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) rather than a standard likelihood ratio test has to be consid-
ered as under the null hypothesis the latter violates the regularity conditions, and thus its distribution is
unknown. AIC is deﬁned as AIC = lnL − k, where lnL is the log likelihood at the maximum and k the
number of estimated parameters.
14For a detailed discussion of the estimated coeﬃcients, see Haan (2006b)
15To calculate the household speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity I derive for each household posterior
probabilities for the discrete mass points (Haan, 2006b).
15in the period before is about 40%. For a woman who had been working in the last period
this probability is according to the standard errors signiﬁcantly lower. The diﬀerence
increases with the number of working hours. For a full-time working woman the probability
of inactivity in the next period is about 6% which is 34 percentage points lower; for a
woman working over-time the diﬀerence amounts to more than 36 percentage points. For
a woman who had been working part-time the diﬀerence in the probability not to work in
the current period relative to the same average women who had been inactive, is lower,
yet still important and signiﬁcant. These ﬁndings are in line with the results of Prowse
(2005); on the extensive margin she ﬁnds a higher level of genuine state dependence for
full-time workers than for those in part-time work.
Mechanical Eﬀect of the Tax Reform
In order to analyze the mechanical eﬀect of the tax reform, I simulate the hypothetical
tax payments and the resulting net household income for all households under the ﬁscal
regime 2000 and 2005. The diﬀerence between the net household income in both scenarios
measures the mechanical eﬀect.
[Table 5 : about here]
Table 5 shows this eﬀect of the tax reform by the discrete working choices. In addition
to the average eﬀect for the whole population, I present the mechanical eﬀect by region,
diﬀerentiating between east and west Germany. In line with the ﬁndings of Haan and
Steiner (2005), the results show that the tax reform has a positive eﬀect for almost all
households. Small negative eﬀect are related to the impact of bracket creeping. The
mechanical eﬀect of the tax reform increases the monthly net household income of the
relevant population on average by nearly 138 Euro which amounts to a relative increase of
more than 4%. By working hours the results show that absolute and relative gains increase
16with the number of hours worked. This trend is not monotonic as labor income combines
hourly wages and working hours, and moreover taxable income includes other sources of
income such as income from rent, self employment or capital gains. In west Germany the
mechanical gains of the tax reform are markedly higher than in east Germany, both in
relative and in absolute terms. As Haan and Steiner (2005) point out this is due to the
still better economic situation in the western part going along with higher gross income
and taxable income. This implies that the gains of a reduction in the tax burden are by
deﬁnition higher in west Germany.
The mechanical eﬀect clearly indicates that the German tax reform provides incen-
tives for increasing labor supply as long as the substitution eﬀect exceeds the income
eﬀect. Thus, this mechanical eﬀect is the driving force for the behavioral adjustment of
households. Given the estimated preferences for income and leisure, and moreover the
estimated true state dependence, I derive the dynamic behavioral eﬀect of the tax reform
in the following.
Dynamic Behavioral Eﬀect of the Tax Reform
As the labor supply eﬀects of the tax reform cannot be derived analytically within the em-
ployed discrete choice framework, I simulate the impact of the change in the ﬁscal rules on
women’s labor supply decision numerically based on the estimated preferences for income
and leisure. The expected probability of each discrete working hour choice is predicted, for
both the pre- and post-reform scenario.16 Based on the predicted probabilities, I derive
the transition matrix for each ﬁscal regime, M2000 and M2005 as described above.
Based on the transition matrix and assuming a ﬁrst order Markov transition process,
I calculate transition matrices for future periods. The advantage of this procedure is
16Hence, this method assumes that the preferences for income and leisure remain constant over time and
regime.
17that stochastic transition matrices conditional on the previous labor market status can be
simply derived not only for period t but as well for future periods t+k. Technically this is
done by taking the power with degree t+k of the transition matrix Mt+k, where t describes
the period of interest. Hence, the transition matrix after the second period is simply the
square of the transition matrix of the ﬁrst period, after period 3 the polynomial of the
transition matrix to the power of three has to be calculated, and so on.17 The transition
probabilities provide information about the average number of working hours and the
average labor market participation rate at the end of each period. Thus, I can explicitly
derive the impact of the tax reform on the number of working hours and the labor market
participation after each period. Elasticities derived after the ﬁrst period are deﬁned as the
short-term elasticities. A Markov process converges in the long run. Formally, the steady
state is reached if t → ∞. Empirically, the steady state is reached if a further period does
not aﬀect the transition matrix and the labor supply elasticities converge i.e. if they do
not diﬀer signiﬁcantly.
Table 6 yields the labor supply eﬀects of the German tax reform with respect to
the relative change in weekly working hours and with respect to the relative change in
the participation rate over time. In addition to the average population eﬀect, I present
bootstrapped conﬁdence intervals.
[Table 6 : about here]
In line with previous research, I ﬁnd that the behavioral eﬀect of tax German tax
reform is positive and signiﬁcant.18 Moreover, the results clearly indicate that behavioral
responses to the tax reform are increasing over time. In the short-run, that is in the ﬁrst
17Haan (2006b) describes this methodology in more detail and discusses the assumptions of a ﬁrst order
Markov process.
18In this analysis I do not consider potential eﬀects of tax avoidance. Agell, Persson, and Sachlen (2004)
show that tax avoidance reduces the labor supply eﬀects of decreasing marginal tax rates. Therefore, the
presented elasticities are on the upper bound of potential behavioral responses.
18period, female labor market participation increases on average by 0.25%. The relative
average increase of the the weekly working hours amounts to 0.75%. As discussed above,
the signiﬁcantly present state dependence in female labor supply restricts women to fully
adjust their labor supply in the ﬁrst period. In the second period the impact of state
dependence is reduced. Thus, the relative eﬀect of the tax reform in terms of participation
and working hours markedly increases to 0.4% and 1.14%, respectively. Over time the
adjustment process is further increasing yet at decreasing rates. With respect to the
average elasticities, the results indicate that in the 5th period the adjustment process is
completed and the participation and working hours are in equilibrium. The adjustment
in further periods does not aﬀect the average labor market behavior as point estimates of
the elasticities are nearly constant over time. This implies, in the long run the tax reform
leads to an increase in the participation rate of 0.5% and on average to an increase in
working hours by 1.5%.
Unfortunately, the relatively large conﬁdence intervals do not allow to draw strong
conclusions about signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the short- and the long-run eﬀects. For
both, the participation eﬀect and the working hours, the conﬁdence intervals of the ﬁrst
and the ﬁfth period slightly overlap. This is in contrast to the ﬁndings in Haan (2006a).
Comparing the short- and long-run eﬀects of a uniform wage increase, he ﬁnds signiﬁcant
diﬀerences over time. Thus, the large conﬁdence intervals are due to the heterogenous
eﬀects of the tax reform on diﬀerent groups, ranging from negative eﬀects for those only
aﬀected by bracket creeping to highly positive eﬀects for those with high taxable income.
The behavioral eﬀect of the tax reform by region exhibits the expected pattern. Due
to the higher working incentives for women in the western part related to the higher
mechanical eﬀect of the tax reform, both the participation and the working hours eﬀects
are higher in western than in eastern Germany. In line with Haan (2006b) who ﬁnds a
19higher state dependence for west German women, the diﬀerence between the short- and
the long-run eﬀects seems to be higher in the West. The average elasticity with respect
to participation increases in the west from 0.25 in the short-run to 0.63 in the long run
(in the 5th period), whereas in the east the diﬀerence of the same elasticity over time is
with 0.2 (1st period) to 0.32 (5th period) relatively low. The same pattern holds true for
the working hours elasticity. Yet, again due to the relatively large conﬁdence intervals,
it is not possible to draw strong conclusions about signiﬁcant diﬀerence as the conﬁdence
intervals by region and over time slightly overlap.
6 Long Run Eﬀects of the Tax Reform: Static vs. Intertem-
poral Modelling
As mentioned above, previous studies evaluating reforms in the tax and beneﬁt system,
such as the labor supply eﬀects of the German tax reform (Wagenhals 2000, or Haan and
Steiner 2005) or eﬀects of in-work credits (Blundell, Duncan, McCrae, and Meghir, 2000),
have been based on static speciﬁcations of labor supply. Static models do not account for
potential eﬀects of state dependence and it is assumed that households can immediately
adjust to the new incentive system. Thus, although static models are misspeciﬁed if state
dependence is signiﬁcant, the behavioral eﬀects derived in these models can be interpreted
as long-run eﬀects of a reform in the tax and beneﬁt system.
In the following, I derive the labor supply eﬀects of the tax reform using the static
speciﬁcation and compare the eﬀects to the long-run eﬀects derived above in the the
intertemporal framework. For comparative reasons I will estimate the static model using
the same speciﬁcation as describes above however without accounting for state dependence,
zit−1 and the initial state zi0. Thus the utility function in the static framework has the
following form:
20˜ Vijt = U(lfijt,lmijt,yijt,xit,ci(xi,ai),ijt). (6)
Unobserved heterogeneity enters in the same way as described above, hence the likeli-
hood function can be derived analogously to the intertemporal framework. The estimation
results of the static model are presented in the Appendix. Given the signiﬁcant improve-
ment in the estimation when allowing for a ﬂexible structure of the random eﬀects and
for better comparison to the intertemporal speciﬁcation, labor supply eﬀects are derived
based on this model.
The labor supply eﬀects in the static model are derived numerically by simulating the
labor market participation and working hours before and after the tax reform. The relative
change given the reform are the elasticities of interest. In the following table, I present the
average relative change in the labor market participation and the average relative change
in working hours by region. The eﬀect of the static model are compared to the long-run
changes derived in the intertemporal model. In addition to the eﬀects of the tax reform,
I present as well the labor supply eﬀects induced by a 1% increase in gross wages which
described the labor supply in a more general way.
[Table 7 : about here]
In general, the elasticities derived in the static model exhibit the expected patter.
Behavioral changes of married or cohabiting couples living in west Germany tend to be
stronger both in terms of participation and working hours. The estimated labor eﬀect
of the tax reform is lower than found in previous studies (Wagenhals 2000, or Haan and
Steiner 2005) . This diﬀerence is due to the ﬂexible modelling of unobserved heterogeneity
in this speciﬁcation. Elasticities derived in a model without heterogeneity or in less ﬂexible
speciﬁcations of unobserved eﬀects as suggested in Haan (2006a) are of the same size as
21found in the previous studies. Thus, in contrast to Haan (2006a) my estimations suggest
the modelling of unobserved does matter for estimating labor supply elasticities.
Comparing the results of the static model to the long-run eﬀects derived in the speciﬁ-
cation accounting for state dependence, it is remarkable to ﬁnd how similar the prediction
of the long-run eﬀects are for the whole sample and by diﬀerentiated by region. This
results is robust to both the eﬀects of the tax reform and the change in gross wages.
7 Conclusion
In contrast to previous ex-ante evaluations of tax reforms, this study employs a intertem-
poral structural model of labor supply to estimate the labor supply eﬀects of the German
Tax Reform 2000. In line with previous studies my ﬁndings suggest that the marked
reduction of marginal tax rates and a broadening of the tax base have a signiﬁcant and
positive eﬀect on the labor supply of married and cohabiting women. Moreover I ﬁnd that
signiﬁcant state dependence in the labor supply behavior of women leads to a dynamic
process in the labor supply adjustment. In the short run where state dependence pre-
vents women for fully ﬂexibly changing their behavior, the relative change of participation
and working hours is modest. Over time state dependence looses its signiﬁcance and the
women fully adjust to their new equilibrium. Thus long-run eﬀects of the tax reform are
markedly higher. On average the participation elasticity doubles from 0.24 in the short
run to 0.55 in the long run. The diﬀerence in the elasticity for working hours is similar,
with 0.74 in the short and 1.42 in the long run.
When I compare the long-run elasticities derived in the intertemporal speciﬁcation
to elasticities estimated in static models of labor supply which do not control for state
dependence, I ﬁnd very similar results. This ﬁnding is encouraging for the application
of both models. It suggests that elasticities of the static model can be interpreted as
22long-run eﬀects of a reform. Further, it implies that the relatively simple modelling of the
dynamics in the intertemporal framework based on a ﬁrst order Markov process seems to
be suﬃcient to derive behavioral adjustment over time.
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278 Appendix
Speciﬁcation of the Utility Function
For the speciﬁcation of the utility function, I assume a quadratic utility function similar
to Blundell, Duncan, McCrae, and Meghir (2000). Disposable net household income and
the leisure of both spouses, their interaction and their quadratic terms enter the utility
function. Hence, the utility function to be estimated has the following form:




+α7yijtlfijt + α8yijtlmijt + α9lmijtlfijt.
I assume that the marginal utility of income and leisure varies across households by
age, education, number and age of children, region, nationality, the lagged dependent
variable, the initial state and the random eﬀect:
α1 = β1 + γ1x1it, (8)
α2 = β2 + γ2x2it + afj, j ∈ {1,2}, (9)
α3 = β3 + γ3x3it + amj, j ∈ {1,2}, (10)
where af1 and am1 are normalized to zero. The lagged dependent variable, the initial
state and the mean values of all time varying characteristics are included in vectors (x1it)
and (x2it) and enter the speciﬁcation through the net household income and through the
female leisure term. The previous employment state is deﬁned as the realized leisure time
in the previous period and enters in linear and quadratic terms.19 To capture the disutility
19More ﬂexible speciﬁcations for the state dependence with vectors of dummy variables do not change
the results of this analysis.
28related to ﬂexible arrangements, I follow van Soest (1995) and include dummy variables
for the part time categories of women in vector (x1it).
[Table 8 : about here]
29Table 1: Working hours, net household income and region
Alternative Share Hours Women Hours Men Net Income East Germany
% per Week per Week in Euro %
1 2.45 0 0 1280 42.15
2 1.52 19 0 1720 34.67
3 2.15 40 0 2166 40.57
4 13.56 0 37 2438 13.13
5 8.76 9.5 37 2672 4.85
6 17.69 24 37 2968 14.87
7 13.90 37 37 3205 36.39
8 3.46 45 37 3396 48.54
9 9.35 0 48 2845 16.23
10 5.16 9.5 48 3082 5.49
11 11.15 24 48 3386 20.15
12 7.29 37 48 3596 50.00
13 3.56 45 48 3794 46.59
The following working hours (weekly) classiﬁcations are used: men: 0, 0-40, >40;
women: 0, 0-14, 15-34, 35-40, >40.
The overall share of households in east Germany is about 20%.
Net household income (monthly) is calculated on basis of the microsimulation
model STSM. The net household income is the expected mean income in the
given alternative.
Source: SOEP, wave 2000-2003, STSM.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Fiscal Year 2000 2001 2002
Monthly net household income in Euro 2944 1017 3101 1190 3162 1213
Age of the husband 41.92 6.84 42.93 6.84 43.93 6.83
Age of the wife 39.87 6.85 40.87 6.85 41.87 6.86
Share of German men 0.89 0.31 0.90 0.31 0.90 0.30
Share of German women 0.89 0.31 0.90 0.30 0.90 0.30
Share with no degree (husband) 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14
Share with medium degree (husband) 0.78 0.42 0.78 0.42 0.78 0.42
Share with high degree (husband) 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40
Share with no degree (wife) 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13
Share with medium degree (wife) 0.83 0.37 0.83 0.37 0.83 0.37
Share with high degree (wife) 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36
Share with bad health status (husband)
1 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.12
Share with bad health status (wife)
1 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10
Share of couple living in East Germany 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42
Share of household with child younger 3 years 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23
Share of household with child between 3 and 6 years 0.16 0.37 0.13 0.33 0.08 0.27
Weekly working hours of husband in period t 39.94 10.23 38.69 10.97 37.63 12.12
Weekly working hours of husband in period t-1 39.13 10.47 39.94 10.23 38.69 10.97
Weekly working hours of husband in the initial state
2 39.13 10.47 39.13 10.47 39.13 10.47
Weekly working hours of wife in period t 20.62 15.64 20.28 15.25 20.27 15.10
Weekly working hours of wife in period t-1 20.32 15.38 20.62 15.64 20.28 15.25
Weekly working hours of wife in the initial state
2 20.32 15.38 20.32 15.38 20.32 15.38
Observations 1645 1645 1645
1)Percentage of people who are with 100% disabled.
2)Initial state is the working behavior in the ﬁscal year 1999.
Source: SOEP, wave 2000-2003.
30Table 3: Estimation results: Intertemporal labor supply estimation
Coef. Std. Coef. Std. Coef. Std.
Net Income
Age - Man -38.062 12.568 -39.624 13.980 -36.8423 15.248
Age2 - Man 46.775 14.487 48.687 16.11 45.7298 17.520
Age - Woman 17.773 9.4502 16.738 11.602 17.7893 12.080
Age2 - Woman -21.235 11.326 -19.705 13.897 -21.3965 14.478
Leisure t-1 - Man -0.084 0.005 -0.0463 0.0058 -0.0502 0.0061
Leisure t-1 - Woman -0.010 0.00 -0.0042 0.006 -0.0060 0.007
Leisure t-0 - Man -0.050 0.005 -0.0546 0.0065 -0.0578 0.007
Leisure t-0 - Woman -0.007 0.005 -0.018 0.006 -0.0124 0.007
Constant 11.420 2.441 11.672 2.846 11.0119 3.081
Net Income2 -0.085 0.022 -0.135 0.0296 -0.1392 0.0310
Leisure Man
Age - Man 0.1541 0.470 -0.030 0.5245 0.0820 0.544 9
Age2 - Man 1.091 0.404 1.349 0.4760 1.218 0.4979
German - Man 0.024 0.028 0.0404 0.0289 0.037 0.0291
East German - Man -0.0138 0.070 -0.0170 0.0892 -0.0161 0.0888
Health Status - Man -0.0165 0.046 -0.001 0.0458 -0.0027 0.0455
Medium Education Degree - Man -0.0241 0.007 -0.031 0.0085 -0.0303 0.008
High Education Degree - Man -0.0471 0.008 -0.0485 0.0105 -0.047 0.010
Age - Man -0.0096 0.003 -0.009 0.0033 -0.009 0.003
Health Status - Man 0.0395 0.048 0.016 0.0491 0.0177 0.0489
German - Man -0.0342 0.028 -0.048 0.0293 -0.04513 0.02952
East German - Man 0.021 0.070 0.033 0.0893 0.032 0.0889
Constant 0.442 0.071 0.458 0.0909 0.4263 0.0947
Leisure Man2 -0.002 0.000 -0.004 0.0001 -0.0044 0.0001
Leisure Woman
Age - Woman -0.2131 0.458 -0.347 0.4840 -0.1801 0.5469
Age2 - Woman 0.5311 0.402 0.548 0.4281 0.3353 0.5101
German - Woman -0.0040 0.046 -0.005 0.0461 -0.0027 0.0489
East German - Woman -0.1570 0.116 -0.149 0.1156 -0.1710 0.1280
Health Status -Woman -0.0660 0.048 -0.066 0.0488 -0.0739 0.0511
Child 0-3 0.1248 0.019 0.118 0.0192 0.1452 0.0213
Child 3-6 0.0143 0.011 0.013 0.0113 0.0231 0.0123
Medium Education Degree - Woman -0.005 0.013 -0.003 0.0139 -0.0018 0.0170
High Education Degree - Woman -0.0277 0.014 -0.023 0.0149 -0.025 0.0181
Leisure t-1 - Man -0.0017 0.001 -0.002 0.0013 -0.0019 0.0012
Leisure t-1 - Woman 0.0114 0.001 0.011 0.0014 0.0064 0.0017
Leisure2 t-1 - Man 0.0003 0.000 0.001 0.0011 0.001 0.0011
Leisure2 t-1 - Woman -0.0042 0.0011 -0.004 0.0011 -0.0008 0.0014
Leisure t-0 - Man -0.0009 0.0002 -0.000 0.0002 -0.000 0.0003
Leisure t-0 - Woman 0.0036 0.0002 0.003 0.0002 0.0054 0.0003
Age - Woman -0.0004 0.0031 0.000 0.0032 0.000 0.003
Child 0-3 0.0275 0.0214 0.027 0.02139 0.071 0.024
Child 3-6 -0.0287 0.013 -0.028 0.0135 -0.037 0.015
Health Status - Woman 0.0914 0.0542 0.087 0.0544 0.1182 0.0614
German - Woman -0.000 0.046 0.002 0.0466 -0.0004 0.0497
East German - Woman 0.1488 0.1164 0.141 0.1158 0.1632 0.128
Constant 0.290 0.0793 0.323 0.0847 0.4433 0.101
Leisure Woman2 -0.0074 0.0002 -0.007 0.0002 -0.008 0.000
Net Income*Leisure Man 0.0054 0.0030 -0.001 0.0038 -0.00193 0.0039
Net Income*Leisure Woman 0.0077 0.0022 0.005 0.002 0.0051 0.0029
Leisure Man*Leisure Woman 0.080 0.1525 -0.2795 0.169 -0.1674 0.1701
Part Time 1 -1.275 0.075 -1.283 0.0752 -1.302 0.0809
Part Time 2 -0.6245 0.0785 -0.6258 0.0785 -0.7342 0.0857
Mass point - Woman 0.0194 0.0074 -0.209 0.0156
Mass point - Man 0.3026 0.0125 0.303 0.013
p1 0.2717 0.0178 0.2340 0.0176
p2 0.7282 0.0178 .0307 .0078
p3 0.6896 .01953
p4 0.0456 .0123
Observations 4935 4935 4935
Log-Likelihood -8287.609 -8050.505 -7998.9504
Derivatives
Uy > 0 95% 95% 95%
Ulf > 0 70% 70% 70%
Ulm > 0 95% 75% 75%
Time dummies for the year 2001 and 2002 have been included.
Variables in italic are the individual mean values.
Unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to follow a non parametric distribution. For both. men and




i ) = 1. To guarantee plausible results a multinomial speciﬁcation
of the probabilities. rather than the probabilities p2-p4. has been estimated. The standard errors of the
probabilities are derived using the delta method.
Source: SOEP, wave 2000-2003 and STSM.
31Table 4: Transition matrix of labor supply: All women
Inactivity (t) Part-time 1 (t) Part-time 2 (t) Full-time (t) Over-time (t)
Inactivity (t-1) 0.403 0.266 0.288 0.040 0.002
0.014 0.011 0.015 0.006 0.001
Part-time 1 (t-1) 0.293 0.245 0.374 0.082 0.006
0.008 0.010 0.008 0.007 0.001
Part-time 2 (t-1) 0.154 0.184 0.453 0.185 0.024
0.010 0.006 0.014 0.007 0.002
Full-time (t-1) 0.065 0.104 0.444 0.319 0.067
0.008 0.010 0.010 0.013 0.005
Over-time (t-1) 0.039 0.067 0.400 0.388 0.106
0.007 0.010 0.012 0.020 0.009
The following hours classiﬁcations are used: 0, 0-14, 15-34, 35-40, >40.
Standard errors are given in italic. Standard errors are derived using bootstrapping with 100
replications.
Source: SOEP, wave 2000-2003.
Table 5: Mechanical eﬀect of the tax reform by working hours and by region
All households West Germany East Germany
Income Mechanical Eﬀect Income Mechanical Eﬀect Income Net Mechanical Eﬀect
(in Euro) (in Euro) (in %) (in Euro) (in Euro) (in %) (in Euro) (in Euro) (in %)
1 1303 -0.06 -0.01 1408 -0.01 0.00 1057 -0.16 -0.02
2 1506 -2.42 -0.12 1576 -0.44 -0.04 1386 -5.83 -0.26
3 1899 49.49 1.86 2064 71.65 2.74 1516 -1.74 -0.16
4 2427 75.71 2.76 2493 82.75 3.00 1935 23.53 0.99
5 2632 83.88 2.89 2655 86.33 2.96 2131 31.34 1.37
6 2950 139.20 4.39 3026 145.96 4.54 2484 97.52 3.51
7 3025 182.56 5.34 3163 210.82 5.96 2691 114.41 3.86
8 3206 184.80 5.16 3310 222.31 5.96 3074 137.08 4.14
9 3005 121.14 3.48 3191 136.27 3.82 1853 27.73 1.34
10 3297 130.25 3.49 3314 132.69 3.55 3078 99.84 2.67
11 3449 191.61 5.06 3567 203.34 5.24 2935 140.40 4.27
12 3358 217.93 5.77 3656 269.64 6.69 2937 145.06 4.47
13 3444 224.48 5.84 3764 276.23 6.68 2898 135.95 4.41
All 2908 138.07 4.05 3009 148.67 4.28 2511 96.33 3.14
The discrete working hours are deﬁned in table 1.
The mechanical eﬀects accounts for the impact of bracket creeping for the years 2000 - 2005. The cumulated
inﬂation rate is assumed to be 8.6%.
Income measures he average net household income. This and the mechanical eﬀect are per months. Results
have been derived using the simulation model STSM.
Source: SOEP, wave 2000-2003.
32Table 6: Dynamic behavioral eﬀect of the tax reform by region
Period All Women West Germany East Germany
Part. Hours Part. Hours Part. Hours
1 0.24 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.20 0.76
(0.13 - 0.36) (0.47 - 1.02) ( 0.12 - 0.40) ( 0.42 - 1.06 ) (0.14 - 0.26 ) (0.55 - 0.96)
2 0.40 1.14 0.46 1.22 0.28 1.04
(0.24 - 0.60 ) (0.73 - 1.59) (0.24 - 0.74) (0.72 - 1.74) (0.19 - 0.32 ) (0.74 - 1.34)
3 0.49 1.31 0.56 1.46 0.31 1.15
(0.30 - 0.74) (0.85 - 1.86) (0.30 - 0.93 ) (0.91 - 2.10) ( 0.21 - 0.35) (0.80 - 1.49)
4 0.53 1.38 0.60 1.57 0.32 1.19
(0.33 - 0.81) (0.91 - 1.98) ( 0.33 - 1.01) (1.01 - 2.26) (0.22 - 0.36) (0.83 - 1.55)
5 0.55 1.41 0.63 1.62 0.32 1.21
(0.34 - 0.84) ( 0.93 - 2.03) (0.34 - 1.05) ( 1.06 - 2.33) ( 0.22 - 0.36) (0.84 - 1.57)
6 0.56 1.42 0.63 1.64 0.32 1.22
(0.35 - 0.86) (0.94 - 2.06) (0.34 - 1.07) (1.08 - 2.36) (0.22 - 0.36) (0.84 - 1.58)
7 0.56 1.42 0.63 1.65 0.32 1.22
(0.35 - 0.86) (0.95 - 2.07) ( 0.35 - 1.08 ) (1.10 - 2.38) (0.22 - 0.36) (0.84 - 1.58)
Elasticity Part. measures the relative change (in %) in the labor market participation due to the
tax reform.
Elasticity Hours measures the relative change (in %) in the working hours due to the tax reform.
The eﬀects are mean-eﬀects for the relevant population which are derived based on the mean tran-
sition matrices assuming a ﬁrst order Markov process.
The 5th and 95th percentiles are given in brackets; they are derived using parametric bootstrapping
with 100 replications.
Source: SOEP: wave 2000-2003.
Table 7: Dynamic behavioral eﬀect of the tax reform by region
Period All Women East Germany West Germany
Tax Reform 1 % Wage Tax Reform 1 % Wage Tax Reform 1 % Wage
Long run behavioral eﬀects: Static Speciﬁcation
Part. 0.55 0.08 0.39 0.06 0.6 0.09
(0.40 - 0.74 ) (0.07 - 0.09 ) (0.37 - 0.42) (0.05 - 0.07) (0.42 -0.83) ( 0.083 -0.11)
Work. hours 1.26 0.19 1.18 0.14 1.28 0.20
(0.89 - 1.65) ( 0.16 - 0.21) ( 1.06 - 1.31) ( 0.12 - 0.16) (0.85 - 1.76) (0.17 - 0.27)
Long run behavioral eﬀects: Intertemporal Speciﬁcation
Part. 0.55 0.08 0.32 0.04 0.63 0.08
(0.34 - 0.84) (0.059) - 0.089) ( 0.22 - 0.36) (0.03 - 0.05) (0.34 - 1.05) (0.07 - 0.10)
Work. hours 1.41 0.18 1.21 0.12 1.62 0.19
( 0.93 - 2.03) (0.15 - 0.2) (0.84 - 1.57) (0.09 - 0.15) ( 1.06 - 2.33) (0.16 - 0.23)
The long run elasticities derived with the intertemporal speciﬁcation are the steady state elasticities after the
5th period.
Elasticity Part. measures the relative change (in %) in the labor market participation.
Elasticity Hours measures the relative change (in %) in the working hours.
The 5th and 95th percentiles are given in brackets they are derived using bootstrapping with 100 replications.
Source: SOEP, wave 2000-2003.
33Table 8: Estimation results: Static labor supply estimation
Coef. Std. Coef. Std. Coef. Std.
Net Income
Age - Man -46.15607 9.396685 -81.385 14.35303 -88.73868 16.16961
Age2 - Man 53.97168 10.75089 95.87257 16.60322 105.0521 18.68873
Age - Woman 13.45448 8.299583 25.31031 9.626845 28.83561 12.16644
Age2 - Woman -17.56247 9.874616 -31.09971 11.5006 -35.75927 14.55331
Constant 9.790931 1.986592 13.0114 2.60192 15.12427 3.134458
Net Income2 -0.1199752 0.0202699 -0.0632672 0.022597 -0.1450344 0.030437
Leisure Man
Age - Man 0.1371018 0.3914165 -0.5598075 0.4527031 -0.5895849 0.5174154
Age2 - Man 0.8477751 0.3347316 1.650443 0.4009794 1.850803 0.4777305
German - Man 0.0583797 0.028294 0.0541524 0.0280716 0.0612455 0.0305388
East German - Man 0.004594 0.0747284 -0.0030424 0.0678476 -0.006188 0.1063871
Health Status - Man 0.022123 0.041764 0.0232425 0.0415753 0.0249544 0.0476873
Medium Education Degree - Man -0.0213231 0.0067121 -0.0222985 0.0067905 -0.0303093 0.0085484
High Education Degree - Man -0.032272 0.0081122 -0.0369526 0.0082668 -0.0327359 0.010469
Age - Man -0.0077445 0.0026285 -0.0072849 0.0029398 -0.0084656 0.0032131
Health Status - Man 0.0030631 0.0439511 0.0010223 0.0440871 -0.0137679 0.050507
German - Man -0.0704752 0.0284816 -0.0647706 0.0282918 -0.0693295 0.0308361
East German - Man -0.0051762 0.0748184 0.0003896 0.0679405 0.0169816 0.10649
Constant 0.5036835 0.0601937 0.59033 0.0711679 0.9424887 0.0879882
Leisure Man2 -0.00272 0.0001085 -0.0025287 0.000111 -0.0050191 0.0001787
Leisure Woman
Age - Woman 0.4050487 0.310614 1.551821 0.5123565 1.313344 0.5647459
Age2 - Woman -0.5479297 0.2716625 -1.659246 0.5144604 -1.64587 0.5767619
German - Woman -0.0020594 0.0289125 0.0043455 0.0418048 0.0034721 0.0414075
East German - Woman -0.0591318 0.0791017 -0.1224367 0.1149999 -0.1190275 0.1139247
Health Status -Woman -0.0239274 0.0288824 -0.0511784 0.043786 -0.0496212 0.0432932
Child 0-3 0.0352977 0.0114357 0.1089184 0.0165189 0.1040021 0.0167005
Child 3-6 0.0072122 0.0068998 0.0337881 0.0106537 0.0318582 0.0107427
Medium Education Degree - Woman -0.0001685 0.0081515 0.0151436 0.0219745 0.0217637 0.0187667
High Education Degree - Woman -0.0271396 0.0087718 -0.0573288 0.0234748 -0.0523167 0.0208829
Age - Woman 0.0016906 0.0021244 0.0001122 0.0028896 0.0023706 0.0030826
Child 0-3 0.0398004 0.0130337 0.0776569 0.0213674 0.0757309 0.0217333
Child 3-6 0.0304647 0.0082138 0.0315605 0.0145916 0.0354325 0.0149102
Health Status - Woman 0.021653 0.0316066 0.0494054 0.0516589 0.0420571 0.0506113
German - Woman -0.0069329 0.0291663 0.0150691 0.0424926 0.0106493 0.0421974
East German - Woman 0.0196338 0.0791527 0.0404037 0.1154575 0.0293842 0.1141058
Constant 0.3395846 0.0502068 0.2644332 0.0893861 0.288241 0.0986961
Leisure Woman2 -0.0034692 0.0001841 -0.0058541 0.0002382 -0.0060157 0.0002289
Net Income*Leisure Man -0.0106433 0.0027733 -0.0036909 0.0030263 -0.0120518 0.0038875
Net Income*Leisure Woman 0.0014668 0.0014731 0.0104661 0.0024811 0.0069293 0.0026166
Leisure Man*Leisure Woman -0.2690029 0.113016 -0.5002491 0.1893915 -0.1591214 0.1479671
Part Time 1 -1.322631 0.0669319 -1.056761 0.08065 -1.120036 0.0755335
Part Time 2 -0.7532578 0.0741605 -0.4861816 0.0817561 -0.5186073 0.0798842
Mass point - Woman 0.2198366 0.0063166 0.2188472 0.0062605
Mass point - Man 0.02684 0.0063814 -0.3262338 0.0103602
p1 0.585642 .0176174 .3958597 .01636
p2 0.41435 .0176174 .3017989 .0148805
p3 .1797322 .0129811
p4 .1226091 .0106845
Observations 4935 4935 4935
Log-Likelihood -10752.957 -9882.1273 -9428.132
Derivatives
Uy > 0 100% 95% 95%
Ulf > 0 70% 70% 70%
Ulm > 0 95% 75% 73%
Time dummies for the year 2001 and 2002 have been included.
Variables in italic are the individual mean values.
Unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to follow a non parametric distribution. For both men and women 1 mass
points is freely estimated. Probabilities p2-p4 are estimated, p1 is derived following the underlining assumption PM
m=1 Pi(am
i ) = 1. To guarantee plausible results a multinomial speciﬁcation of the probabilities, rather than
the probabilities p2-p4, has been estimated. The standard errors of the probabilities are derived using the delta
method.
Source: SOEP, wave 2000-2003 and STSM.
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